Cultural Marxism and the Alt-Right

The Meaning of Corporatism

356 Enviro-critical Websites and additional info about the organized enviro-critical movement

Pierre Trudeau: Eco-fascist

A Primer for the Paris Climate Talks

Jorge Bergoglio's Green Encyclical

Environmentalism and Aboriginal Supremacism (Part 2): The Mobilization of Aboriginal Opposition to the Northern Gateway Pipeline

Environmentalism and Aboriginal Supremacism in Canada - Part 1 - Idle No More

Of Buffalo and Biofuel - More Tales of Environmentalism in Alberta

War on Coal

In Praise of the Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act (Bill C-38)

Environmentalism and Edmonton Land Use Politics

The "Tar Sands" Campaign and the Suppression of North America's Energy Potential

Desertec and Environmentalism's North African Campaign

The Environmental Movement in Alberta

Environmentalism 400 BC

Spirit of NAWAPA

Waldheim's Monster:
United Nations' Ecofascist Programme

Early 19th Century British "Environmentalism"

Environmentalism's Appropriation of Christianity

Environmentalism's Environment

The Continental Counter-Enlightenment

The American Eco-Oligarchy update

If Only This Were About Oil

BROTHER CAN YOU SPARE A HECTARE

Who is Affraid of The Big Green Wolf

The Gore Presidential Bid

The Groundbreaking Career of Doctor Science

The English Environmental Elite, Global Warming, and The Anglican Church

The Great Global Warming Hoax

The American Oligarchy's Economic Warfare Campaign on British Columbians



No Aristocracy, No Environmentalism

By William Walter Kay

"To maintain and transmit a value system, human beings are punched, bullied, made into heroes, encouraged to read newspapers, stood up against the wall and shot, and sometimes even taught sociology." (1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Intro
Moore's General Theory
Moore's Proto-fascism
Moore's Fascism
Conclusion

Intro

Barrington Moore was a senior research fellow in Harvard’s Russian Research Centre through the height of the Cold War. While he authored six books and edited a seventh, his fame rests on his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966). To write this text, Harvard gave Moore “a precious boon of time” (several years) and access to resident scholars (notably Herbert Marcuse). Social Origins, a popular and academic success, is credited with revitalizing Historical Sociology. Lost in the accolades is one of Social Origins’ main assertions – fascism, wherever it developed, was the project of an aristocratic, landed upper class. This is also a feature of environmentalism. Moore’s list of fascism’s signature traits: anti-capitalism, anti-industrialism, anti-urbanism, anti-materialism, pseudo-radicalism, romantic nostalgia, and the denial of progress are also features of environmentalism. 

Historical Sociology became a recognized, self-conscious discipline as History and Sociology converged empirical interests and methodological approaches. To purists, History means studying old documents (particularly state records) and archaeological artefacts while Sociology is confined to analyzing current events through surveys, interviews, fieldwork, statistics, and socio-psychological experimentation. Yet Historians seek to reconstruct “societies” and Sociologists, being concerned with change, study history. Historical Sociology is not merely History with social context or Sociology with historical background. Historical Sociologists are concerned with the transition to industrialism, with the universal sequences of structural differentiation in industrializing societies. They investigate capitalist expansion and state growth through constructing and illustrating theories about geographically, temporally located processes of bureaucratization, democratization, and revolution. They study interactions between human agency, including collective action, and social structures, including economic class. They pursue convincing, comprehensive explanations for changing patterns of freedom and constraint. Their focus is “world history” and the “world economy”; thus, on the relations between core and peripheral areas and on interactions between states.

 

Moore's General Theory

Social Origins details three routes to modernity: democratic-capitalist, communist, and fascist. Moore studied revolutions, highlighting the roles of landed upper classes and peasants, and concluded that the way landed elites reacted to the challenge of commercial agriculture determined the route taken.
The fascist route was a “conservative revolution from above” involving the imposition of “labour-repressive modes” of agriculture and industry by a traditional ruling group. It occurred in countries where the liberal-capitalist impulse was weak. If this impulse took a revolutionary form, the revolution was aborted. Afterward, merchants and industrialists relied on the landed elite to force through modernization. Landed upper classes used political and social levers to hold a labour force on the land while transitioning to a retarded form of commercial farming. Industrial development proceeded but so problematically that brief unstable periods of elected parliaments fell to violent cultish dictatorships. Fascism results from the reluctance or inability of ruling circles to bring about fundamental structural change. The fascist syndrome is rooted in agrarian life; is a reaction to a democracy movement; is a response to the strains of industrialism but cannot flourish without industrialism. (2) A crucial factor in the “anatomy of these governments has been the retention of a very substantial share in political power by the landed elite.” (3) Fascism’s major cause was “the survival of a landed aristocracy into modern times.” An aristocracy is “the indispensible social basis of right-wing authoritarian regimes that show a strong tendency to culminate in fascism under the impact of advanced industry.” (4) The problem with states dominated by landed elites was:

“...to make the transition to a paying commercial agriculture without the repression of those who worked the soil and to do so the same in industry, in a word, to use modern technology rationally for human welfare was beyond the political vision of these governments...these systems crashed in an attempt at foreign expansion, but not until they had tried to make reaction popular in the form of fascism.” (5)

Championing “peasant virtues”, especially ones profitable to agrarian upper classes, is a characteristic of fascism. In discussing this, Moore coins the word “Catonism” to refer to a tendency he dates to Cato (234-149 BC). Catonism is a cacophony of notions arising out of a threatened aristocracy. Catonists extol: sternness, agriculture, militarism, and tradition; and denounce: democracy, foreigners, intellectuals, technology, and the power of money. Catonism justifies repressive measures buttressing those in power. While praising the peasant, it ignores changes hurting the peasants, denies the need for reform, and relieves the conscience of those responsible for the damage. Catonism is an upper-class mythology about peasants often embraced by peasants because it rationalizes their plight through scapegoating capitalists. In modern times, Catonism is the adoption by landed upper classes of repressive, exploitative methods in response to the intrusion of market relations into the agrarian economy. Catonism is an attempt by aristocracies to mystify the commercializing of their estates through “labour repressive forms of capitalist agriculture.” (6) It arises as aristocracies cling to power during industrialization. Moore summarises Catonism’s strategic defects:

“...to hold down a subject population, the upper classes have to generate an anti-rationalist, anti-urban, anti-materialist and more loosely anti-bourgeois view of the world – one that excludes any conception of progress. And it is very difficult to see how industrialism can take firm hold without a push from people who hold a very materialist conception of progress that included sooner or later concrete improvement in the situation of the lower classes....Catonism...finally compromises itself out of existence to fuse with more definitely urban and capitalist forms of romantic nostalgia.” (7)

In the other routes to modernity “landed upper classes either became an important part of the capitalist and democratic tide... or they were swept aside in the convulsions of revolution or civil war.” The most important example is England. Moore’s analysis of the English Civil War (1642-51) and Industrial Revolution stresses the aristocracy’s survival. Many in the landed elite adapted well to capitalism and there was much “osmosis” between the commercializing gentry and the rising urban capitalists. A hybrid class of capitalist-landlords led the Parliamentary side of the Civil War. Moore points to Cromwell’s home turf, Suffolk, a stronghold of Parliamentary leaders who were an “ exclusive county club comprising most of the brains and much of the wealth of the shire.” Among these landed families “mercantile and agricultural enterprise had developed to an unusually high degree...few were without close commercial connections, and in the agricultural exploitation of their estates Suffolk landowners were as ardent as any.” (8) The English compromise was “a parliament of landlords with bourgeois overtones.” (9) Far from disappearing, “the English landed aristocracy retain(ed) control of political machinery right through the nineteenth century.” (10) This reflected the aristocracy’s dominance in the agricultural sector and agriculture’s continuing importance in the national economy. 19th century British agriculture consisted of landed proprietors and near landless agricultural labourers. The 1851 census revealed 2.4 million persons with economic connection to the land. 35,000 were landed proprietors (“this category included titled aristocrats and the still influential gentry”). The 300,000 farmers included both owner-operators and tenants but the “lion’s share of the cultivated area” was rented from landlords and worked “in the vast majority of cases with hired help”. About 1.5 million did manual field work. (The rest were in miscellaneous categories, including the farmers’ families.) (11) These 35,000 landlords were intermingled with the commercial-industrial elite and dominated Parliament, academia, the judiciary, the military, and the church.

 

Moore's Proto-fascism

Although England never experienced fascism, “in the latter years of the French Revolution and lasting until about 1822, English society passed through a reactionary phase” (12) During this era “a reactionary configuration” consisting of “a coalition between the older landed elites and the rising commercial and industrial ones” undertook a repressive campaign “against the lower classes in town and countryside”. (13) These “hints of fascist possibilities” were evident particularly in the anti-radical riots. (14) The war against revolutionary France justified suppressing the British democracy movement as “advocates of domestic reform were identified with a foreign enemy.” Hence, “the gathering movement to reform Parliament was placed outside the law, the press muzzled, associations that smacked of radicalism forbidden, a rash of treason trials, spies and agents provocateurs let loose among the people, the Habeas Corpus suspended...Repression and suffering were real and widespread.” Moore quotes a famed historian: “A reign of terror was established throughout England by the nobility and middle class – a terror more formidable, though more silent, than the noisy demonstrations of the radicals.” He then backpedals: “No one writing today would be likely to refer to this phase as a reign of terror” because the body count was minimal. In its bloodiest event, the Peterloo massacre (1819), only 11 were killed. (15)

A coterminous case of proto-fascism occurred across the Channel. The French counterrevolution was situated in the countryside and “flared into open warfare in March 1793 and lasted off and on until 1796.” (16) The counterrevolution was precipitated by “the radical phase of the Revolution” which was often “an outright attack on the substantial peasants.” Initially, wealthier peasants benefited from the Revolution; however, grain requisitions, attempts to fix grain prices, and the revolutionary regime’s exacting of higher taxes than the ancient regime turned them against the Republic. Aggravating this was the revolution’s main rural offensive – the seizure of church and aristocratic land. Moore notes: “the sale of lands confiscated from the church and the émigrés was not the source of peasant property, which reaches much further back in French history. Actually the bourgeoisie were by and large the main ones to profit by the sales.” (17) The sale of church property was a “substantial land grab” by urbanites, and the accompanying campaign against priests was an “attack on the linchpin of rural society.” (18)

The counterrevolution’s centre was the Vendee region where events are “a particularly piquant topic today because it is the only major peasant uprising directed against what is loosely called the Left. The rebels fought under the cries of “Long Live the King and Our Good Priests!” (19) As elsewhere in the counterrevolution, “peasants accepted noble leaders.” Programmatically, “the main thrust of the counterrevolution was anti-capitalist.” (20) Features making the Vendee a hotbed were: “In this part of France the nobles owned a great deal of land – in the heartland of the counterrevolution, the lion’s share, around 60%...the nobles were absentees...The income of the nobility came from leasing out their land to the peasants.”(21)As well: “In contrast to the adjacent Patriot countryside...counterrevolutionary territory was a land of enclosures...Peasants rented farms from the nobility, in size generally of 20 to 40 hectares, rather large by French standards.” (22)Also important “in the specific conditions of the Vendee, was the attack on the clergy because it was part of a general offensive: economic, political and social at once.” In the Vendee, and elsewhere, “every formal organization a countryman could belong to – school, brotherhood, vestry, charity, and of the church itself – was religious.” In 1790 the revolutionary regime forced the reorganization of local government. In the Vendee “the inhabitants responded in revealing fashion by electing the cure as mayor. The cure was the ‘natural’ leader.” In 1791 the revolutionary regime demanded priests swear allegiance to the Republic. In the Vendee “the clergy refused.” (23) Moore notes, “The repression of the counterrevolution was the bloodiest domestic act in the French revolutionary drama.” (24) During this period, most of the revolutionaries’ 40,000 killings were carried out. (25)

The French Revolution’s consequences are famously inconclusive. On the one hand, it “mortally wounded the whole interlocking complex of aristocratic privilege; monarchy, landed aristocracy, and seigniorial rights, a complex that constituted the essence of the ancient regime.” (26) However, the old order was not extinguished, resulting insubsequent political crises beginningwithNapoleon’sdemise. During the reigns of Louis XVIII and Charles X (1814-1830) “the old landed aristocracy...recovered about half the landed property it had lost in the Revolution” and became “the dominant, indeed the only, political group in France.” After the 1830 Revolution, and an ill-fated aristocratic uprising in 1832, “the old aristocracy disappeared from the political arena as a coherent and effective political group, even if it retained considerable social prestige for a long time afterward.” (27) Their legacy lives on in “the weakness of any purely bourgeois impulse in France (and)...in the continuation of the peasant economy into modern times.” (28) One of the purest expressions of 20th century Catonism was “the extreme conservatism in France that came to the surface as window dressing for Vichy.” (29)

In his discussion of the circumstances around the US Civil War, Moore notes the “plantation aristocracy” and their “labour repressive agricultural system” were obstacles to “democratic capitalism.” (30)Because “plantation slavery in the United States grew up as an integral part of industrial capitalism” it “presented an obstacle to democracy much more than to capitalism.” (31) This obstacle was overcome in a long process beginning with the Confederacy’s military defeat. The plantation aristocracy preserved labour repressive agriculture via a widespread switch to sharecropping. The country merchant was the plantation owner who, by making advances of groceries to tenant-sharecroppers and by charging exorbitant prices, kept control of his work force amidst a backdrop of lynch-mob justice. (32) At the same time, “industrialists and railroad men” became influential in the South,setting thestage “for an alliance across the former battle lines.” The “classic conservative coalition” was consummatedafterthe 1876 election when “the party of wealth, property and privilege in the North” allied with “Southern Junkers” who “were no longer slaveholders and had acquired a larger tincture of urban business.” (33)

 

Moore's Fascism

Moore first spots fascism in “a brief phase of extremism in Russia after 1905”. Thus, “Russian reactionaries invented fascism.” (34) Russian society was characterized by “a latifundia economy, a dominant antidemocratic aristocracy, and a weak and dependent commercial and industrial class, unable and unwilling to push forward toward political democracy.” (35) Such was the theatre for the following drama:

“...the tiny Russian commercial and industrial class showed some signs of discontent with the repressive Tsarist autocracy and a willingness to flirt with liberal constitutional notions. Workers strikes, however, and the promise contained in the Imperial Manifesto of October 17, 1905 to meet some of the demands of the strikers, brought the industrialists safely back into the Tsarist camp. Against this background appeared the Black Hundreds movement. Drawing partly on American experience, they made ‘lynch’ into a Russian word and asked for the application of zakon lyncha, lynch law. They resorted to violence in storm trooper style to suppress ‘treason’ and ‘sedition.’ If Russia could destroy the ‘kikes’ and foreigners, their propaganda asserted, everyone could live happily in a return to ‘true Russian’ ways. This anti-Semitic natavism had considerable appeal to backward, pre-capitalist, petty bourgeois elements in the cities and among the smaller nobility. However, in still backward peasant Russia of the early twentieth century, this form of rightist extremism was able to find a firm popular basis.” (36)

Moore then turns the searchlight on post-WWI Italy. Italian Fascists did the propagandistic and tactical spadework later used elsewhere. Moore recounts Italian Fascism’s genesis:

“...there was a bitter struggle in the north Italian countryside between Socialist and Christian Democratic trade unions on the one hand and big landowners on the other. At this point...Mussolini...paid no attention to the countryside, did not believe in a fascist conquest of the land, and thought fascism would always be an urban movement. But the struggle between the land-owners and the unions, representing the interests of hired labour and tenants, gave fascism an unexpected opportunity to fish in troubled waters. Presenting themselves as the saviours of civilization against Bolshevism, fasci – bands of idealists, demobilized army officers, and just plain toughs – broke up rural union headquarters, often with the connivance of the police, and during 1921 destroyed the leftist movement in the countryside. Among those who streamed into the fascist ranks were peasants who had climbed into the middle ranks of landowners, and even tenants who hated the monopolistic practises of unions. During the summer of this year Mussolini made the famous observation that ‘if Fascism does not wish to die or worse, to commit suicide, it must now provide itself with a doctrine...I do wish that during the two months which are still to elapse before our National Assembly meets, the philosophy of Fascism could be created’...Only later did Italian fascist leaders begin to declare that fascism was ‘ruralising’ Italy, championing the cause of the peasants, or that it was primarily a ‘rural phenomenon.’” (37)

In Japan the pendulum twice swung between liberalism and reaction. The first swing was the 19th century “Jiyuto” movement of commercially-oriented landlords – “Japan’s first adventure with organized political liberalism.” Upon realizing their activism was radicalizing the peasantry, the movement quickly dissolved. The pendulum swung back with the rise of the reactionary General Yamagata. In 1887 he pushed through laws sanctioning the arrest of anyone, in a 7 mile radius of the Imperial Palace, suspected of “scheming something detrimental to public tranquility.” This led to detainment of 500 opposition leaders. Through to the 1920s, “governments did not resign because they lost elections, whose outcome could generally be manipulated, but because they lost the confidence of an important section of the elite: aristocrats, bureaucrats, or militarists.” (38) Accompanying the reaction was the Nohon-shugi (agriculture-is-the-base-ism) movement described as a “mixture of Shinto nationalism, a belief in the mission of the Japanese, and...physiocratic ideas.” In 1914 the dean of Nohon-shugi “spoke with emotion about the demoralization filtering through the countryside as peasants took to buying lemonade, umbrellas, clogs and youths took to wearing Sherlock Holmes hats.” (39)Despite its peasantism Nohon-shugi was a “town and landlord affair”, and as with peasantists elsewhere “their effect on policy was nil. When the time came to do something concrete for the peasants and tenants who were the subject of this sentimental moralizing, landlord interests in the Diet quickly put a stop to such efforts.” (40)

After Yamagata’s death (1922) the pendulum swung back. Moore argues “the twenties marked the zenith of both Japanese democracy and of the influence of business on Japanese politics...some Japanese newspapers controlled by industrial interests went so far as to raise the cry ‘Keep the Army out of politics.’” Part of the struggle played out in the Army. While the Army brass remained of the nobility, in the 1920s 30% of officer recruits were “the sons of small landowners, rich farmers, and the urban petty bourgeoisie”. (41) Some reservists sided with the peasants in their disputes with landowners. The aristocracy was further threatened in 1928 when Japan adopted universal manhood suffrage. Previously landowners controlled both major parties of the Diet. The aristocracy responded with fascist, anti-capitalist mobilization. Moore believes “anti-capitalist sentiments among the peasants” werestrongenough “to make the peasants follow the leadership of the rural elite”; however, “the peasants’ contribution to Japanese fascism...was mainly a passive one.” (42)

Despite their anti-capitalist rhetoric, landlords imposed a cash-rent system but:
“maintained most of the old village structure because through it they could extract and sell enough surplus to stay on top of the heap. Those who did not make the grade provided recruits for agrarian pseudo-radicalism. The substitution of tenancy relations for pseudo-kinship was the only institutional change needed.” (43)

Likewise, despite the anti-capitalist rhetoric, the fascist era was highly profitable for businesses involved in large construction and the military industrial complex. Moore notes:

“In 1930 heavy industry accounted for only 38% of the total industrial output; by 1942 its share was 73%. Industrial output rose from 6 billion yen in 1930 to 30 billion yen in 1941. The four great zaibatsu firms, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda, came out of the Second World War with total assets of more than 3 billion yen, compared with only 875 millions in 1930...Big business needed fascism, patriotism, Emperor worship, and the military, just as the army and the patriots needed big industry” (44)

In some ways Japan’s fascism differed from German and Italian forms:
There was no sudden seizure of power, no outright break with previous constitutional democracy, no equivalent of a March on Rome, partly because there was no democratic era comparable to the Weimar Republic. Fascism emerged much more ‘naturally’ in Japan...Japan had no plebeian Fuhrer or Duce. Instead the Emperor served as a national symbol in much the same way.” (45)

However there were similarities among fascisms. All shared a pre-existing “feudalization” of a section of businessmen. This fusion of nobility and business facilitated a statist modernization from above. After this coalition established itself, there was a period of conservative, authoritarian governance, which, however, fell short of fascism. (46) The respective elites were trying to solve the insoluble: to modernize without changing their social structures. Pseudo-radical anti-capitalism gained considerable footholds among the masses but the impulse for these ideologies came from landed elites. Totalitarian facades concealed tremendous infighting, and in all fascist regimes philosophical, romantic radicals were excluded from real power.

Social Origins devotes little space to the German experience as Moore thought this was adequately covered by others. German fascism arose from the difficulties labour-intensive agriculture runs into in the face of competition from technologically advanced areas. Germany was a prime example of the situation where: “competition of American wheat exports created difficulties in many parts of Europe after the end of the Civil War. Thiscompetitionintensified “authoritarian and reactionary trends among a landed upper class” thatfoundtheir “economic basis shrinking and therefore turn(ed) to political levers to preserve its rule.” (47)

While the Nazis did not seize power until 1933: “elements of Nazi doctrine appear quite distinctly in the Junker’s generally successful efforts, by means of the Agrarian League established in 1894...Fuhrer worship, the idea of corporative state, militarism, anti-Semitism, in a setting closely related to the Nazi distinction between ‘predatory’ and ‘productive’ capital, were devices used to appeal to anti-capitalist sentiments.” (48)

German fascism was an expression of an ancient regime who, in their struggle for power, allied with urban lower class radicals. Most of the latter were later dispatched, “suddenly and violently, with the destruction of the radical Nazis in the Blood Purge of 1934.” (49) The traditional elite staffed top state positions throughout the Third Reich, and while many were unsympathetic to the Nazis, the murder-and-propaganda machine under the plebeian Fuhrer’s control precluded resistance. Thus, with the exception of their 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler, with the war already lost, the aristocratic-state elite was “a passive technical instrument at Hitler’s command.” (50)

 

Conclusion

Social scientist Moore was not without normative opinions. He was committed to “the ancient Western dream of a free and rational society” – a dream frustrated when “powerful vested interests oppose change.” (51) His solution: “getting rid of agricultural as a major social activity is one prerequisite for successful democracy. The political hegemony of the landed upper class ha(s) to be broken.” (52)

One deficiency in Moore’s analysis is his failure to discuss hereditary landlordism in the urban arena where it performs the same role as it does in rural areas. Big money, old money, aristocratic rentiers are structurally resistant to development. In agriculture they campaign for land-intensive, labour-intensive modes of production. They oppose “factory farming,” pesticides, genetically modified organisms, irrigation, and forest clearances as these, if unconstrained, lower the value of existing farmland. They support organic farming, agriculture protectionism, and bio-fuels as these increase the value of existing farmland. On the urban front the real estate in metropolitan areas is owned by aristocratic elements similarly hostile to development – to suburbanization, to rezoning vast under-utilized areas, and to wilderness clearances in peripheral regions as these policies diminish the value of their properties.

During the Cold War, when the words “bourgeois democracy” were common currency among the Left, Moore gained notoriety for his quip: “No bourgeois, No democracy.” (53) At this time political scientists pondered why, unlike European countries, there was no mass socialist party in the USA. The explanation for American exceptionalism was “No feudalism, No socialism.” The movement to constrain development, “environmentalism”, would not exist without the patronage and participation of aristocrats and neo-aristocrats who have nothing to gain from progress. No aristocracy, No environmentalism.


Footnotes

  1. Moore, Barrington; Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Penguin Press, London 1967, p 486
  2. Ibid p 445
  3. Ibid p 438
  4. Ibid p 106-7
  5. Ibid p 442
  6. Ibid p 491-5
  7. Ibid p 496
  8. Ibid p 513
  9. Ibid p 108
  10. Ibid p 428
  11. Ibid p 514-6
  12. Ibid p 442-3
  13. Ibid p xvii
  14. Ibid p 444-5
  15. Ibid p 443
  16. Ibid p 92
  17. Ibid p 107
  18. Ibid p 99
  19. Ibid p 92
  20. Ibid p 92
  21. Ibid p 93-5
  22. Ibid p 96-7
  23. Ibid p 99
  24. Ibid p 100
  25. Ibid p 103
  26. Ibid p 105
  27. Ibid p 106
  28. Ibid p 428
  29. Ibid p 491
  30. Ibid p 146
  31. Ibid p 428
  32. Ibid p 147
  33. Ibid p 149
  34. Ibid p 445
  35. Ibid p 153
  36. Ibid p 445
  37. Ibid p 451
  38. Ibid p 295
  39. Ibid p 295-6
  40. Ibid p 296-7 & 307-8
  41. Ibid p 297
  42. Ibid p 308
  43. Ibid p 313 & 296
  44. Ibid p 301-2
  45. Ibid p 304
  46. Ibid p 437
  47. Ibid p 437
  48. Ibid p 448
  49. Ibid p 302
  50. Ibid p 304
  51. Ibid p 508
  52. Ibid p 429
  53. Ibid p 418
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